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IT’S NOTHING PERSONAL:
WHY EXISTING STATE LAWS ON POINT-OFSALE CONSUMER DATA COLLECTION
SHOULD BE REPLACED WITH A FEDERAL
STANDARD
KATE MIRINO†
“Are you interested in signing up to receive exclusive offers
and news about our products via email?” We almost all have
fielded some variant of this question at the check-out counters of
the retail stores we frequent. And it is no wonder that
businesses continue to experiment with new methods of
obtaining our email addresses—it has been forecasted that, by
2019, more than 246 billion emails will be exchanged around the
world each day.1 In 2018, the prevalence of email in our daily
lives is already overwhelming, making it “one of the most
profitable and effective” platforms out there for promotional
messaging.2
From a commercial standpoint, email—“the
lifeblood of the Internet”—allows for expansion beyond the
traditional bounds of advertising and helps businesses penetrate
the broader worlds of consumers.3
Technological growth as rapid as that which has occurred in
the digital space over the past several decades is almost certain
to generate ambiguities across all areas of the law. Privacy, and
information privacy in particular, is one field in which especially
puzzling questions have arisen.
Information privacy, as
distinguished from decisional privacy—the focus in Roe v. Wade,
for example—can be viewed “as the result of legal restrictions
†
Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2019, St. John’s University
School of Law; B.A., 2012, Boston College. Many thanks to Professor Jeff Sovern for
his helpful guidance on this Note.
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Email Statistics Report, 2015-2019, THE RADICATI GROUP, INC. 3 (2015),
https://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Email-Statistics-Report2015-2019-Executive-Summary.pdf (last visited June 21, 2019).
2
JEANNIEY MULLEN & DAVID DANIELS, EMAIL MARKETING: AN HOUR A DAY 4
(2009).
3
Id. at 5.
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and other conditions, such as social norms, that govern the use,
transfer, and processing of personal data.”4 In the United States,
information privacy is a segmented body of law, made up of a
disconnected set of sector-specific rules, which have been
established by an unintended mix of “federal and state
legislatures, agencies and courts, industry associations,
individual companies, and market forces.”5 Other commentators
similarly have described United States information privacy as
“ad hoc,”6 “patchwork,”7 and “piecemeal,”8 the oversight of which
has been entrusted to “a hodgepodge” of uncoordinated actors.9
Much of today’s uncertainty in this area stems from the
challenges those actors have faced in adapting a core principle of
information privacy law—namely, what has been dubbed
“personal data,”10 “personal information,”11 or “personally
identifying information (‘PII’)”12—to contemporary life. Because
it is the “personal“ quality of certain types of information that
springs consumer rights,13 a clear definition of what counts as
“personal” is crucial to any law in this sphere. Traditionally
defined as “information relating to an identifiable individual,”14

4
Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2055, 2058 (2004).
5
Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L
L. 1, 22–23 (2000).
6
Id. at 3.
7
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 904 (2009).
8
Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087,
1088 (2006) (reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: PRIVACY AND
TECHNOLOGY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004)).
9
Shaffer, supra note 5, at 26 (identifying such “[r]esponsible agencies” as “the
Federal Trade Commission, the Office of Consumer Affairs, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Social
Security Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Reserve Board, and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration”). “To date, these agencies do
not coordinate their data privacy oversight.” Id.
10
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 2058.
11
See, e.g., Éloïse Gratton, If Personal Information is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, Then
Risk of Harm is the Key: A Proposed Method for Determining What Counts as
Personal Information, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 105, 110 (2014).
12
See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Direct Marketing, Mobile Phones, and Consumer
Privacy: Ensuring Adequate Disclosure and Consent Mechanisms for Emerging
Mobile Advertising Practices, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 229, 239 (2008).
13
Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and A New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1824 (2011);
see also Gratton, supra note 11, at 110.
14
Gratton, supra note 11, at 112.
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from a modern perspective, personal data is a much hazier
concept, and no standard definition has been established in the
United States.15 In today’s world, even “a few scraps” of
anonymous data on the Internet can be enough to piece together
someone’s identity;16 thus, as the development of technology
continues to accelerate onward, some commentators suggest
adherence to a definition of personal data that is more fluid and
dependent upon continuing social advancements.17
One subset of information privacy law that has proven
particularly murky in modern application is that which governs
how private entities collect the personal information of
consumers during in-store transactions.
California’s
Song-Beverly Credit Card Act (“Song-Beverly” or the
“Song-Beverly Act”), for example, which was enacted in 1971 to
bolster consumer protections against credit card fraud and
preserve data privacy, prohibits businesses from requesting or
requiring that a customer provide personal identification
information during the course of a credit card transaction,
subject to limited exceptions.18 Similar laws have been enacted in
several other jurisdictions, and they each apply to varying
categories of information, transactions, and conduct.19 One
element that is consistent among them, however, is that they all
were passed before “the advent of modern electronic payment
methods, online transactions, downloadable products and the
Internet,” rendering their application in today’s retail
atmosphere uncertain.20 Judicial interpretation of these laws
necessarily involves some gap filling, and often varies from one
jurisdiction to the next, leaving consumers with inconsistent

15

Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1816.
Mark Bartholomew, Intellectual Property’s Lessons for Information Privacy,
92 NEB. L. REV. 746, 747–48 (2014).
17
See, e.g., Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1818.
18
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(a) (West 2018).
19
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105 (West 2018); see also D.C. CODE
ANN. § 47-3153 (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a (McKinney 2018); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 50-669a (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317 (West 2018);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:11-17 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.214 (West
2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 6-13-16 (West 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401 (West 2018).
20
Amy P. Lally & Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Today’s Retailers are Fighting
Yesterday’s Privacy Laws, LAW 360 (June 27, 2014, 11:21 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/552220/today-s-retailers-are-fighting-yesterday-sprivacy-laws.
16
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safeguards and businesses with scant guidance on how to
maintain compliant practices.21
Accordingly, this Note proposes a contemporary-minded
federal solution to preempt and standardize the various,
outmoded state approaches in this field. Part I engages in a
historical overview of the development of information privacy law
in the United States.
Part II provides a summary and
comparison of the existing state rules at play. Part III discusses
the negative consequences—both to consumers and to
businesses—of inconsistent regulation in this area, and explains
why a federal solution is necessary. Part IV outlines the
parameters of the federal regulation proposed by this Note.
I.

THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES

Dating as far back as the colonial era, the common law
always protected “against eavesdropping” in the United States.22
Later on, the passage of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution reflected the
intent of the framers to exclude the government from certain
private realms of the people:23 the Third Amendment limits the
government’s freedom to quarter soldiers in private homes;24 the
Fourth Amendment protects the “persons, houses, papers, and
effects” of individuals from “unreasonable searches and
seizures”;25 and the Fifth Amendment provides that no “private
property [shall] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”26
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to
explore information privacy law concepts as early as 1877, when
it held that sealed letters and packages in the mail, as opposed to
newspapers, magazines, and other items intentionally left open
to inspection, could be “opened and examined only
under . . . warrant.”27 The Court recognized that those rights of
21

See id.
Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, PROSKAUER ON
PRIVACY 1–4 (2006), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=
https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2076&context=faculty_publications.
23
Id. at 1-5.
24
U.S. CONST. amend. III.
25
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877); see also Solove, supra note 22,
at 1–7.
22
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individuals—whatever their precise definition or scope—were “of
far greater importance than the transportation of the mail.”28
And in the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, the Court noted that
“[n]o law of Congress [could] place in the hands of [postal]
officials . . . any authority to invade the secrecy of letters
and . . . sealed packages in the mail.”29
With the advent of telegraphic messages as a mode of
communication technology, courts and legislators grappled with
how to regulate them.30 Tort privacy, as discussed by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis in their celebrated Harvard Law
Review article, The Right to Privacy,31 had some influence on
early perceptions of information privacy law.32 Even in simpler
times, Warren and Brandeis recognized that the evolution of
society and technology will require continual endorsement of new
rights,33 and they cited the intricacies of modern life as “hav[ing]
rendered necessary some retreat from the world.”34 Reviewing
thoroughly a person’s right to decide whether and how
extensively his feelings or thoughts could be made public, the
commentators also mused, in a broader sense, that an individual
must be able to control public access to “that which is his,”35 to
elect “to be let alone,”36 and to enjoy “the right to [his]
personality.”37
Whereas the currency of personal information in the
nineteenth century was rooted largely in its role in the exchange
of gossip,38 personal information has, in later years, come to
harbor more substantial, sophisticated sources of value. Through
the 1960s and 1970s, digital recordkeeping systems and data
analysis methods began to facilitate unprecedented means of

28

Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 732; see also Solove, supra note 22, at 1-7.
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733; see also Solove, supra note 22, at 1-7.
30
See, e.g., Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 90–91 (1880) (“[t]elegraphic messages
are . . . of recent origin, and, therefore, the common law furnishes nothing but
analogies for our guide.”); see also Solove, supra note 22, at 1-7.
31
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890); see also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 907 (“Tort privacy’s centrality to
the law of information privacy has also waned over time.”).
32
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 907.
33
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 193.
34
Id. at 196.
35
Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
36
Id. at 205.
37
Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
38
Id. at 196.
29
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identifying individuals from their personal information.39 As a
result, the concept of privacy law in the United States was finally
expanded to include clear control over one’s personal data. In
1984, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act,
and made a significant breakthrough in “not only refer[ring] to
PII, but also mak[ing] PII the trigger for the applicability of the
law.”40
The law’s means of protecting individual control over one’s
personal data developed as “Fair Information Practices” (or
“FIPs”)—certain duties on processers of personal information
that revolve around the following principles:
(1) limits on information use; (2) limits on data collection, also
termed data minimization; (3) limits on disclosure of personal
information; (4) collection and use only of information that is
accurate, relevant, and up-to-date (data quality principle);
(5) notice, access, and correction rights for the individual; (6) the
creation of processing systems that the concerned individual can
understand (transparent processing systems); and (7) security
for personal data.41

United States privacy law enforces FIPs through different
sets of rules for public and private actors,42 and in the private
realm, unlike the omnibus regimes at play in other countries,
rules in the United States are generally sector-specific.43 Some
observers opine that this evolutionary path has been the result of
legislative “react[ion] to public scandals,” and not of a proactive
commitment to comprehensive privacy protection.44
The
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing Act (“CAN-SPAM” or the “CAN-SPAM Act”), for
example, governs email, specifically.45
It identified as
problematic the “rapid growth in the volume of unsolicited
commercial [email]” received by consumers,46 and noted that
inconsistent state laws on the matter made it difficult for
businesses to comply with all applicable standards.47
39
See Gratton, supra note 11, at 110; see also Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13,
at 1821. Before computers, to link data to a person, the data would almost always
need to contain the person’s name or likeness. Id.
40
47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1824.
41
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 907–08.
42
See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 24.
43
See Richards, supra note 8, at 1088.
44
Shaffer, supra note 5, at 25.
45
See 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).
46
§ 7701(a)(2).
47
See § 7701(a)(11).
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CAN-SPAM’s response to the dilemma was a nationwide
regulatory scheme prohibiting private entities from, among other
things, gathering consumer email addresses “through improper
means” or sending false or misleading information to consumers
via email.48
California’s Song-Beverly Act and other state laws in the
point-of-sale data collection field all are focused on one very
specific zone of conduct: the requesting and recording of
consumers’ personal data by merchants at the time of sale. The
laws differ, however, in important respects, both textually and as
judicially interpreted and applied. Thus, motives similar to the
driving forces behind CAN-SPAM warrant a standardized,
federal solution.
II. CALIFORNIA’S SONG-BEVERLY ACT AND OTHER
STATE LAWS AT PLAY
Over a dozen United States jurisdictions have laws that
restrict how commercial entities may collect the personal data of
consumers at the point of sale.49 In general, the laws prohibit
businesses from requiring a customer to provide certain types of
personal information as a condition to accepting the customer’s
credit card as payment.50 Aside from this basic unifying premise,
the laws vary significantly. The exceptions they itemize, for

48
15 U.S.C. §§ 7703(b)(2)(A)(i), 7704(a)(1) (2012). Other examples of federal,
sector-specific information privacy laws include: the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (“COPPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012), which governs how entities
collect personal information from children online; the Financial Services
Modernization Act (the “Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012),
which governs how financial institutions collect and protect the personal information
of consumers; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012) et seq., which governs how entities collect
consumer health information.
49
See Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note 20.
50
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(a)(2) (West 2018); see also KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-669a(a) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(a) (West 2018); N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:11-17 (West 2018);
69 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a) (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 6-13-16(a) (West 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401(1) (West 2018); D.C. Code Ann.
§ 47-3153(a) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(a) (West 2018). In
Oregon, while a business may require a credit or debit card holder to provide
personal information, it may not record that information on a transaction form. See
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.214(1) (West 2018). In California and the District of
Columbia, businesses may neither require nor request that a credit card holder
provide certain personal information as a condition to accepting the credit card. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(a)(2); D.C. Code Ann. § 47-3153(a).
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example, are inconsistent.51 Many designate “special purpose[s],”
such as shipping, warranty, delivery, servicing, installation, or
special orders, for which a business may request and record a
customer’s personal information.52 Others permit a business to
collect a customer’s personal information if the business’s credit
card issuers will not complete the credit card transaction without
it,53 or if federal or state laws or contractual obligations require
the business to collect it.54
Still others have carved out
exceptions for businesses that process credit card transactions by
mailing settlement forms to designated bankcard centers,55 and
for various other sets of circumstances.56
Perhaps the most troublesome discrepancy among these
statutes, however, is their lack of alignment on a clear
understanding of what counts as personal identification
information—the type of data springing each law’s applicability
to consumer transactions. The varying definitions that have

51

See Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note 20.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(c) (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a(c)
(West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a) (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(b) (West
2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401(2) (West 2018); see also D.C. Code Ann. § 473153(b) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(b) (West 2018). New
Jersey has no such “special purpose” exception. Massachusetts and Oregon do, so
long as the customer provides the information for one of the enumerated special
purposes voluntarily. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(a) (West 2018); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.214(2) (West 2018).
53
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a(c) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93,
§ 105(a) (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 56:11-17 (West 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a) (West
2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(a) (West 2018).
54
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(c)(3)(A), (C) (West 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2602(a)(3) (West 2018).
55
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(b)(3) (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW
§ 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a)(2) (West
2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(b) (West 2018).
56
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(c)(1) (West 2018) (permitting businesses to
collect personal information in connection with cash advance transactions, and
permitting motor fuel retailers to collect ZIP codes solely to prevent fraud, theft, or
identify theft); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(c)(1) (West 2018) (permitting
businesses to collect credit card information where the card serves as a deposit to
ensure payment if default, loss, or another similar event occurs); see also MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(b)(2) (West 2018) (permitting businesses to collect
personal information where the credit card issuer’s authorization with respect to the
customer’s available credit is unnecessary to conclude the transaction); 6 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(b), (c) (permitting businesses to collect personal information if
the customer provides it pursuant to the business’s request, or where the credit card
issuer must provide authorization as to the availability of credit to conclude the
transaction); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401(2)(a) (West 2018).
52
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been adopted for this term are discussed categorically below and
provide a useful backdrop to the problems identified by this Note.
A.

Expansive Definitions of Personal Identification Information

The farthest reaching state statutory definitions of “personal
identification information” appear in California’s Song-Beverly
Act57 and in Kansas’s state statute.58 These laws define “personal
identification information” as “information concerning the
cardholder, other than information set forth on the credit card,
and including, but not limited to, the cardholder’s address and
telephone number.”59
In California, the imprecision of this definition coupled with
the complexities of modern retail environments have required a
certain level of judicial extrapolation to set the exact parameters
of this term.60 In Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., for
example, the California Supreme Court focused on the broad
reach of the word “concerning” in holding that a customer’s ZIP
code qualified as “personal identification information” under the
Song-Beverly Act.61 Because a customer’s ZIP code identifies the
area in which he or she lives, in the court’s view, it plainly
satisfies Song-Beverly’s standard as “information concerning the
cardholder.”62 In support of its decision, the court located in

57
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (West 2018). Song-Beverly was enacted in 1971
and amended in 1991, 1995, 2004, 2005, and 2011, but never to set forth a modern
conceptualization of what counts as “personal identification information.” CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1747.08 (West 2018).
58
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a(b) (West 2018). Kansas’s statute was enacted in
1992, more than twenty-five years ago. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a (West 2018).
59
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a(b) (West
2018).
60
See, e.g., Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612, 620 (Cal.
2011) (holding that a consumer’s ZIP code constitutes “personal identification
information” under the Song-Beverly Act). The California Supreme Court’s decision
in Pineda contradicted the decision in Party City Corp. v. Superior Court, where the
California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District had held that ZIP codes fell
beyond the scope of “personal identification information” under Song-Beverly. Party
City Corp. v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); see also
Florez v. Linens ‘N Things, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 465, 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that the Song-Beverly Act prohibits requests for personal identification
information before the credit card transaction has ended, even if the consumer
understood that providing her information was not required and proceeded to
provide it voluntarily).
61
Pineda, 246 P.3d at 616.
62
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (West 2018) (emphasis added); Pineda, 246 P.3d
at 616. The court considered “immaterial” the fact “that such information might also
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Song-Beverly’s legislative history an intent “to provide robust
consumer protections” by preventing commercial entities from
requesting and recording personal identification information not
required to complete the credit card transaction.63
The timing of a retail store’s request for personal
identification information has also proven relevant under
California case law for purposes of determining liability under
Song-Beverly. In Harrold v. Levi Strauss & Co., the California
Court of Appeal for the First District found that Levi Strauss &
Co.’s practice of requesting a customer’s email address after the
conclusion of the credit card transaction did not run afoul of the
Song-Beverly Act.64 The court explained that a reasonable
consumer would consider the transaction complete after having
been handed the purchased merchandise and a receipt, at which
point a request for personal identification information could not
reasonably be interpreted as a condition to accepting the credit
card as payment.65 From the court’s perspective, Song-Beverly
was designed to prevent retailers from collecting personal
identification information “under the mistaken impression the
information is required to process a credit card transaction.”66
The act does not prohibit retailers from collecting personal
identification information from consumers who provide it
voluntarily and understand that it is not required.67
Similarly broad understandings of personal identification
information can be found in the statutes at play in
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin, which define it as information that
includes, but is not limited to, a customer’s address or telephone
number.68 In Massachusetts, as in California, judicial direction
has been needed to help define the scope of the term. In Tyler v.
Michaels Stores, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
pertain to individuals other than the cardholder.” Pineda, 246 P.3d at 617 (emphasis
in original).
63
Pineda, 246 P.3d at 620.
64
187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 347, 353 (2015). Levi Strauss & Co. assumed for the
purposes of this appeal that an email address counted as “personal identification
information” under Song-Beverly. Id. at 349.
65
Harrold, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 350.
66
Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
67
Id.
68
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(a) (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:1117 (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a) (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(a) (West
2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401(1) (West 2018).
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held that ZIP codes fell within the statutory definition of
“personal identification information,” reasoning that together
with the customer’s name and other public data, ZIP codes can
provide a business with the tools to determine the customer’s
address or telephone number, both of which are explicitly listed
in the statute as examples of personal identification
information.69 The court found support for this reading in the
statute’s primary legislative goal: “to guard consumer privacy in
credit card transactions.”70
B.

Restrictive Definitions of Personal Identification Information

Other jurisdictions have more narrowly limited their
understandings of personal identification information.
In
Maryland and the District of Columbia for example, point-of-sale
data collection statutes apply only to a customer’s address or
telephone number.71 Arguably less ambiguous than their more
expansive counterparts, this definition nonetheless has called for
judicial analysis in the District of Columbia.
In Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia held that a ZIP code
alone is not an “address” within the meaning of the statute.72
The court also noted that retailer Urban Outfitters, Inc., by
recording ZIP codes in its point-of-sale register systems, did not
record that information “on [a] credit card transaction form” in
violation of the statute.73 On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit
explained that the district court had missed the mark in failing
to address whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue and instead
“[dove] into the merits of [the] case.”74 Moreover, the court
concluded that under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
plaintiffs did not in fact have standing, for they had failed to
allege “any cognizable injury” resulting from disclosure of their

69

Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 743–44 (2013).
Id. at 742.
71
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(a) (West 2018); D.C. Code Ann.
§ 47-3153(a) (West 2018).
72
32 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded for lack of
standing, 830 F.3d 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[A] ZIP code cannot be considered the
‘address’ of the ‘cardholder’ since a ZIP code, at best, merely indicates an area in
which multiple addresses may be located.”).
73
Hancock, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 33, vacated and remanded for lack of standing,
830 F.3d 511.
74
Hancock, 830 F.3d at 513.
70
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ZIP codes.75 The court made reference to the basic principle that
legislative drafting “cannot erase” the standing requirements of
Article III of the United States Constitution by affording
plaintiffs a statutory right to sue in circumstances under which
they “would not otherwise have standing.”76 Accordingly, the
precise meaning of “address” (and of “telephone number”) in the
District of Columbia remains somewhat open to interpretation.
III. A CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY STANDARD IS NEEDED
AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
A.

Inconsistent Regulation in this Sphere Is Especially Costly

1.

Point-of-Sale Systems

Most retailers use a point-of-sale system tailored to their
individual business needs, including what is essentially a
personal computer at each point-of-sale location, linked with a
server in the back office of that location, all operated centrally
from the company’s headquarters.77 Businesses under common
management generally incorporate the same point-of-sale
systems in all their locations.78 Point-of-sale systems in retail
settings all work in substantially the same way, but their
operating databases differ.79 The most commonly used databases
in the United States are provided by Microsoft and Oracle, but
other options include systems provided by Linux and Apple.80
Additional market complexities are attributable to preferences
for different system features, such as operator language, from
one retail establishment to the next.81
Modifications to point-of-sale systems and all their
components are generally time-consuming, expensive, and
75

Id. at 514 (“The complaint here does not get out of the starting gate.”).
Id. (quoting Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
77
See Alexander Polyakov, The Vulnerabilities of a POS System, FORBES (Sept.
17, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/09/27/thevulnerabilities-of-a-pos-system/#619f2694b581.
78
See Richard T. Ainsworth, Sales Suppression: The International Dimension,
65 AM. U. L. REV. 1241, 1262 (2016).
79
See id. at 1242 & n.7 (citing DB-Engines Ranking, DB-ENGINES, https://dbengines.com/en/ranking (last visited May 17, 2016) (“[R]anking some 264 different
database management systems or database engines that help run POS
technology.”)).
80
See id. at 1243–44.
81
See id. at 1244.
76
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disruptive to businesses.82 These changes may be necessary,
however, when one state’s point-of-sale data collection law
changes or is interpreted by a court in that state as having a new
or different meaning. Accordingly, the regulatory regime for
point-of-sale data collection practices that the United States as a
nation has accepted—one that continues to take a unique path in
each state—is no longer workable.
2.

Employee Training

State-specific standards also render necessary more
comprehensive employee training programs, to include versions
specially tailored for each jurisdiction in which a unique set of
rules governs. And because these regulations continue to remain
open to judicial interpretation, the point-of-sale data collection
policies of commercial entities must be subject to continual
reevaluation, modification, and reimplementation, as needed.
These considerations demand substantially more time and
expense from an employee training perspective than would a
regime in which a single, standardized set of rules applied across
all jurisdictions.
Moreover, time spent by the typical United States worker
with a single employer is on the decline: “[t]he median number of
years that wage and salary workers had been with their current
employer was 4.2 years in January 2016, down from 4.6 years in
January 2014.”83 In the private sector, the median tenure of
employees was less than half that of public-sector employees.84
Employees in service occupations “had the lowest median tenure
(2.9 years),”85 and employees in sales and related occupations
82
See, e.g., TA Operating LLC v. Comdata, Inc., No. 12954-CB, 2017 WL
3981138, at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2017) (describing how the party switching its
point-of-sale system anticipated a timeline of “approximately two years, but it
ultimately took three years and four months . . . for the [new] system to be fully
deployed.”); see also e2Interactive, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 190240, at *24 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2012) (noting that workaround platforms
often are selected by smaller businesses that decide they cannot bear the costs of
“modify[ing] their point-of-sale (POS) systems”); Burger King Corp. v. Cabrera, No.
10-20480-Civ., 2010 WL 5834869, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2010), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 10-20480-Civ., 2011 WL 677374 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16,
2011) (deciding a dispute over whether franchisee’s refusal to replace point-of-sale
system gave rise to proper and lawful termination by franchisor of franchisee’s
franchise agreements).
83
News Release, Employee Tenure in 2016, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 1 (Sept. 22,
2016), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/tenure_09222016.pdf.
84
See id. at 2.
85
Id.
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were not much higher, with a median tenure of only 3.1 years.86
These factors necessitate further padding of the already sizable
employee training budgets set by retailers in the United States,87
to ensure that their increasingly temporary labor force remain
thoroughly educated about point-of-sale data collection laws and
how to comply with them. Instead, a standardized federal regime
would eliminate the need for such nuanced, state-specific
training policies and procedures.
B.

Existing State Statutes Are Obsolete

The above-described state statutes that govern data
collection at the point of sale all were enacted at least
twenty-four years ago. A handful of them were amended more
recently, but not to address the problems stemming from
continued reliance on provisions whose legislative purposes could
not have contemplated modern retail practices or contemporary
forms of personal identification information.88 As a result, courts
are left to divine how the lawmakers of yesteryear would have
intended these statutes to apply today.89 Retail entities are left
to formulate compliant business practices in the face of
ambiguous regulation,90 and consumers must live with
inconsistent protection of their personal data.
As discussed above, “retrofitting statutes piecemeal” can
produce undesirable outcomes, for example, by generating mixed
judicial understandings of statutory terms like “address.”91 By
way of illustration, whereas the California Supreme Court and
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court both found that a
customer’s ZIP code counted as an “address” and thus qualified
as “personal identification information,”92 the District Court for
the District of Columbia viewed a ZIP code as a mere fragment of
86

Id. at tbl.6.
In 2016, large companies budgeted an average of $14.3 million each to
employee training, midsize companies an average of $1.4 million each, and small
companies an average of $376,251 each. 2016 Training Industry Report,
TRAININGMAG, 32 (2016), https://trainingmag.com/sites/default/files/images/Training
_Industry_Report_2016.pdf.
88
See Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note 20 (“[T]he Song-Beverly Credit Card
Act predates the advent of modern electronic payments, online transactions,
downloadable products and the Internet . . . .”).
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
Id.
92
Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612, 618 (Cal. 2011); Tyler
v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 743 (2013).
87
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an address, which therefore did not rise to the level of “personal
identification information.”93
Such deviations from one
jurisdiction to the next, and continued dependence on rules ever
subject to judicial transformation, are burdensome realities for
commercial entities seeking to maintain shrewd business
practices without discounting the privacy rights of their
customers.
Moreover, in those few jurisdictions in which courts have
applied existing, outmoded statutes to contemporary retail
practices (namely, California, Massachusetts, and the District of
Columbia), the courts’ rationales have relied in part on generic
principles of statutory interpretation in the face of textual
uncertainty.94 As Columbia Law Professor Karl Llewellyn first
pointed out, canons of statutory construction “readily can be used
to cancel each other out,” giving rise to doubts about their
purported objectivity and value as “tools to constrain judges.”95
The findings of one study reveal that even at the United States
Supreme Court level, canons of statutory construction do not
appear to impact “the Justices’ tendency to vote consistently with
their ideological preferences, at least in divided-vote cases.”96
Another study shows that many canons simply are ignored
altogether by lawmakers during the statutory drafting process.97
Thus, while employing traditional principles of statutory
interpretation can seem like a useful exercise, the results may
turn out to be a sharper reflection of judicial philosophy than of
legislative intent.

93
See Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32 (2014), vacated
and remanded for lack of standing, Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511
(2016); see also Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note 20.
94
See, e.g., Pineda., 246 P.3d at 616 (looking to the words of the statute as the
most reliable indicator of statutory intent); see also id. (“[W]e do not construe
statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute ‘with reference to the entire
scheme of law of which it is part’ so that the whole may be harmonized and retain
effectiveness.”); id. (resorting to the dictionary definition of the statutory term
“concerning” as guidance for determining legislative intent); Tyler v. Michaels
Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 740–41 (2013) (relying on the title of the statute in
question as “useful guidance” for determining legislative intent).
95
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06
(1950); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 912 (2016).
96
Krishnakumar, supra note 95, at 914.
97
See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 907 (2013).
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Fresh statutory drafting in the point-of-sale data collection
sphere certainly would produce rules more attuned to modern
retail practices than those enacted decades ago. In addition,
drafting practices today might simply be better than they were in
the past.
As some commentators have observed, notable
improvements in legislative procedures since the birth of
Song-Beverly and its counterparts have “fundamentally altered”
how Congress creates laws98 and have resulted in the creation of
legislation that is “more precise and detailed” than ever before.99
The overall lawmaking process has been thoroughly revamped
and modernized. Custom-made legislative software, for example,
now equips drafters with bill templates and automatic formatting
features to help maintain stylistic uniformity across
documents.100 In addition, the staff makeup of congressional
committees has become highly specialized, such that committee
members, who in the past would have worked on bills across a
range of legal topics, now dedicate themselves to a single, specific
pocket of the law.101 These advances in the legislative process
can hardly be neglected in the point-of-sale data collection space,
where the existing laws are so critically in need of reinvention.102
Even assuming the state statutes currently in effect, as
supplemented by any necessary judicial interpretation, do indeed
approximate their would-be contemporary objectives, there are
boundaries to tasking the judiciary with the regulation of
consumer data privacy.103 If courts were responsible for weighing
fact-specific privacy interests “against the benefits of free data
flows”—an intricate policy determination better left to the
legislature—the resolution of information privacy questions
would require abundant time and resources.104 And because the

98

Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of
Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 816 (2014) (noting how the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970 “paved the way for the modernization of legislative
drafting”).
99
See id. at 813 (“Today, statutes are thoroughly researched and written by
large groups of experts who are more aware of what courts and agencies are doing
than ever before . . . .”).
100
See id. at 821.
101
See id. at 845.
102
To simply amend existing statutes after courts have opined on their meaning
in new contexts would fail to provide sufficient direction to courts, consumers, and
retailers as novel questions continue to arise. See Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note
20. Accordingly, a federal statutory approach is the most sensible solution.
103
See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 37.
104
Id.
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situations in which those questions could arise are “virtually
infinite,” judges simply would not be able to manage them all.105
The data privacy field is also uniquely challenging due to the
“informational asymmetry” that exists between consumers and
the entities that collect their personal data, as well as the
“behavioral tendencies [of consumers] to underestimate longterm risk.”106 These realities can cause laypersons to formulate
incorrect beliefs and further reinforce this Note’s proposal that
these important decisions be entrusted to a well-informed
legislature.
C.

Counterargument: The States as Laboratories

As Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis famously
observed in a 1932 dissenting opinion, the states bear a solemn
duty to test out the answers to emerging social or economic
questions, and stifling a state’s exploratory spirit “may be
fraught with serious consequences to the nation.”107 A major
benefit of our federal system is that it allows for “a single
courageous state” to act as a laboratory and to engage in valuable
trial and error “without risk to the rest of the country.”108 The
judicial branch may at times decide to terminate that process,109
but as Justice Brandeis cautioned, it must do so prudently, “lest
[the courts] erect [their] prejudices into legal principles.”110
In the information privacy law universe, commentators have
acknowledged the states’ particularly meaningful role as
laboratories.111 States have, for example, “been the first to
identify areas of regulatory significance and to take action,”112
responded to difficult questions with “innovative approaches,”113
105

Id.
Nicole A. Ozer, Putting Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social
Movement and Creating Corporate Change, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215,
220 (2012).
107
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
108
Id.; see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular
Phone Regulation?, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 155, 172 (“The United States is perceived as
a federalist experiment due to its relatively heavy use of overlapping jurisdictions,
from mosquito abatement districts to the U.S. Government.”).
109
New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[The Court]
may strike down the statute which embodies [an experiment] on the ground that, in
[the Court’s] opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.”).
110
Id.
111
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 916.
112
Id. at 917.
113
Id.
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and made possible “simultaneous experiment[ation] with
different policies.”114
But the ultimate goal of state
experimentation is to utilize the findings gathered to pinpoint
the most effective, workable solution to a problem. With respect
to Song-Beverly and its equivalents, the states have had an
opportunity to experiment—one that now has spanned several
decades—and the time has come for analysis of the findings
gathered and “coherent policy implementation of the knowledge
gained.”115
There are, of course, circumstances under which
individualized, state-by-state regulation is more appropriate
than a nationwide rule—namely, when the regulated conduct is
territorially confined and there are few “market spillovers.”116 In
those cases, the benefits of locally tailored approaches might well
outweigh the costs of forgoing or disturbing economies of scale.117
On the other hand, federal standardization makes more sense
when an approach that has generated efficiencies in one
jurisdiction is likely to do so in others, rendering
“[b]alkanization”
unnecessary,
wasteful,
and
bad
for
consumers.118 When diverse, state-specific rules govern conduct
that is substantially the same across the country, local legislative
and regulatory bodies look to maximize the benefits to their own
constituents, where possible, by “shifting costs” to other
jurisdictions.119
Moreover, even if one jurisdiction deems
stringent regulation of a particular activity unjustifiably costly,
and therefore forgoes it, national businesses nonetheless often
decide to comply with the rules of the most restrictive states,
imposing on all states, and on all consumers, their costs of doing
so.120 By contrast, consumers enjoy both direct and indirect
advantages when regulations are consistent nationwide.121 They
114

Id. at 918.
Id. at 932.
116
Hazlett, supra note 108, at 156.
117
Id. at 175. State-specific rules are generally more suitable “when local
markets are relatively idiosyncratic, when the benefits of diverse rules are large
relative to the costs of non-uniformity, [and] when the rules adopted in one state are
largely contained within that jurisdiction.” Id.
118
Id. at 177 n.74.
119
Id. at 180. “[I]f decentralization would lead to . . . inequitable outcomes
across states, these services should be provided by the national government.” Id. at
179.
120
Id. at 181. “[F]irms adjust to diverse regulations by conforming to those rules
that allow for the best aggregate operations.” Id. at 182.
121
Id. at 184.
115
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benefit directly from “reduc[ed] information costs,” as the rules
they may choose to educate themselves about remain constant in
all settings, and they benefit indirectly from commercial
efficiencies that result in lower prices.122
Under that analysis, in the point-of-sale data collection
space, a federal regulatory regime is most sensible.123 The
conduct being regulated is substantially the same nationwide,
and across all retailers, because it revolves around one basic
commercial goal: to leverage the ever-escalating value of personal
identification information.124
Whether used to formulate
personalized advertisements based on the specific interests of
consumers, or to provide information about consumer purchasing
behaviors, the “commodification” of personal identification
information is a growing trend in the United States,125 and
businesses are certain to continue experimenting with new ways
of obtaining it. This Note proposes that uniformity in the
regulation of its collection at the point of sale will boost actual
compliance and generate commercial efficiencies, resulting in
more consistent protection of data privacy126 and benefitting
consumers in the form of lower prices.
Moreover, in an increasingly mobile world, where residents
of one state frequently travel to and make purchases in various
other states, it is far more practical to establish a single set of
rules that applies across all fifty states. This truth seemingly
has been realized in the privacy regulations of other countries,
for example, in Canada and the European Union,127 where

122
Id. Uniformity in food labeling regulation, as an example, led to greater
“consumer awareness of the ingredients in food.” Id.
123
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 904 (“A patchwork of information privacy
laws now exists in the United States, and it is one with federal and state elements.
In the view of [Bill] Gates and many others, it would be preferable to create a single
federal law for the private sector that would impose uniform standards.”).
124
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 2056–57 (“The monetary value of
personal data is large and still growing, and corporate America is moving quickly to
profit from this trend. Companies view this information as a corporate asset and
have invested heavily in software that facilitates the collection of consumer
information.”).
125
Id.
126
“[P]olling data reveal that Americans are extremely concerned about privacy,
both on and off the Internet.” Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1815.
127
The member countries of the European Union include: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. European Union: EU member countries in brief, EUROPA,
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consumers enjoy “broad-based” protections of their privacy and
personal information.128 By contrast, direct marketing in the
United States is not stringently regulated129—and not by any
sweeping federal laws. While proponents of continued reliance
on “market mechanisms” to protect consumer data privacy130
argue that efficiencies in private activity are most readily
achieved “when government regulation does not constrain
entrepreneurial activity,”131 this Note’s proposed federal
regulatory scheme for the point-of-sale data collection realm will
nonetheless facilitate greater efficiencies than are possible under
the existing framework of conflicting state laws.
IV. THE FEDERAL SOLUTION
A.

Both a Ceiling and a Floor

Federal regulatory schemes can set a “floor”—“a minimum
standard that states may exceed”132—or a “ceiling,” which
“preempt[s] state legislation with the effect of weakening existing
state standards,” as it does not permit more stringent state
regulation above and beyond the federal rule.133 In order to
realize the above-described efficiencies, consumer returns, and
other benefits, uniformity is key, and thus both a floor and a
ceiling are necessary.134 Business leaders in the United States
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en (last
visited May 16, 2019). For now, the United Kingdom remains a full member of the
European Union, but that may change as a result of Brexit. Id.
128
King, supra note 12, at 238.
129
Id. Several commentators argue that “the appropriate architecture” for
digital privacy protection in the United States in “the information age” is one in
which a federal actor oversees the compilation and use of personal data. Richards,
supra note 8, at 1092.
130
Shaffer, supra note 5, at 27 (“Because of the government’s ad hoc approach to
data privacy, U.S. regulation of the private sector largely depends on industry norms
and individual company policies that are developed in reaction to market
pressures.”).
131
Id.
132
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 919–20 (referencing the Video Privacy Protection
Act of 1988, the Wiretap Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
133
Id. at 920–21. The “meritorious aspects” of one federal law—FACTA—were
realized through restricting the extent to which the states could decide to allow for
more stringent consumer privacy protection in their own laws. Id. at 921.
134
Having recognized that some states may have opted not to regulate in this
space because privacy in personal identification information matters less to their
citizens, this Note’s proposed federal standard would be imposed on a take-itor-leave-it basis, such that each state would need to either adopt it or refrain from
regulating. Such an approach aims to respect the decisions of those states whose
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have also weighed in to declare ceiling preemption imperative to
their backing of and cooperation with “any comprehensive
legislation” in this area.135
B.

The Definition of “Personal Identification Information”

Because it is “[t]he fact that certain information is personal”
that triggers consumer rights in this area,136 the parameters of
information privacy law, in general, and of point-of-sale data
collection law, in particular, necessarily are determined by the
“currently unstable category” of personal identification
information.137 In light of this reality, it is difficult to understand
how United States privacy law has not yet delineated a standard
meaning for this term.138 The need for one nevertheless remains
exigent.
In the point-of-sale data collection sphere, a handful of
existing state statutes indicate vague understandings of personal
identification information as data “concerning” the customer,139
and others simply provide non-exhaustive lists of what might
qualify as personal identification information, like a customer’s
address or telephone number.140 In other words, though assorted
meanings have been ascribed to the term, “little thought” has
been dedicated to why one makes more sense than others.141
This Note proposes doing away with a fixed definition of the
types of data that are and are not within the scope of personal
identification information, in favor of a more dynamic
conceptualization of the term—one that accounts for the fact that
technology “is constantly evolving,” and that “depends upon
changing technological developments.”142
Because the

citizens do not desire point-of-sale data collection regulations without sacrificing the
benefits of maintaining uniformity across states whose citizens do wish to protect
their privacy in these items.
135
See, e.g., Microsoft’s Bill Gates Wants New Privacy Law, CIO (Mar. 8, 2007,
7:00
AM),
https://www.cio.com/article/2441839/security-privacy/microsoft-s-billgates-wants-new-privacy-law.html; see also Elena Schneider, Technology Companies
Are Pressing Congress to Bolster Privacy Protections, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/us/technology-firms-press-congress-to-tightenprivacy-law.html; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 921–22.
136
Gratton, supra note 11, at 110.
137
Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1816.
138
Id.
139
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (West 2018).
140
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(a) (West 2018).
141
Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1827.
142
Id. at 1818.

198

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:177

overwhelming goal of data collection at the point of sale is to
forge new avenues of communication with consumers, the
regulation addressing that conduct must set forth a definition of
“personal identification information” that includes whichever
mailboxes, physical or virtual, now known or later invented, at
which a consumer might receive commercial marketing
messaging. Such an approach allows for the inclusion of data
like an individual’s home address, telephone number, email
address, Facebook username, Twitter handle, and Instagram
account, all of which can be conceived of as, or serve as a
pathway to, a consumer mailbox subject to potential targeting by
advertisers. While articulating examples of these mailboxes is
instructive, the broader definition remains “flexible and
evolving,” yet retains “coherent boundaries,”143 such that the
resulting body of data within the scope of the law is neither
under- nor over-inclusive.144
C.

Transaction Types Covered

The existing state statutes are limited, for the most part, to
credit card transactions,145 reflecting one of the legislative goals
of their enactment—to minimize the risk of credit card
fraud—but rather deserting the other goal of protecting
consumer privacy. This Note proposes a rule that applies to all
transactions at the point of sale, regardless of payment method,
such that retailers are foreclosed from circumventing the spirit of
the law by requesting and recording consumer mailbox
information during transactions not covered by the regulation.
D. Mandatory Conduct
1.

Informed Consent

Under this Note’s proposed federal framework, merchants
may record a customer’s mailbox information only after
informing the customer what it will be used for and notifying the
143

Id. at 1827.
See Gratton, supra note 11, at 113. In future contexts, the mailbox approach
will likely still require some level of statutory interpretation. Having identified the
challenges associated with judicial resolution of information privacy questions, this
Note proposes delegation of that task to an administrative agency, such as the
Federal Trade Commission, that is better equipped to manage it than is the judicial
system.
145
Some state statutes also apply to check payment transactions.
144
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customer that providing it is voluntary and not required to
complete the transaction.146 The merchant must provide these
notices in the same format—verbally or in writing—in which the
request for the customer’s mailbox information is made. The
delivery of these notices must be sufficiently “clear and
conspicuous” that a reasonable consumer would have an
opportunity to absorb and understand them, free from
unnecessary, distracting language.147
Thus, whatever the
merchant’s objective in collecting a customer’s mailbox
information, it must be properly disclosed, allowing the customer
to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of sharing that data
and make an informed decision about whether to do so.
2.

Employee Training

Under this proposed federal regime, merchants must
establish company policies and procedures to ensure that any
collected information is used only for those purposes for which
the customer provided consent at the time of collection. The
store associates directly involved in the compilation of consumer
mailbox data must also be trained, initially and periodically
throughout their employment, in accordance with those
policies.148
CONCLUSION
Existing state laws in the United States that govern how
businesses collect and record the personal identification
information of consumers are relics from a time during which

146
This architecture displaces the need to address the reality that “it is now
possible to interpret almost any data as personal information.” Gratton, supra note
11, at 113. Although sophisticated entities easily can “extrapolate a particular
identity from a few scraps of online data,” a merchant would be in violation of the
proposed federal regulation if it used such an “extrapolated” identity without first
having secured that customer’s informed consent. Bartholomew, supra note 16, at
747.
147
Lesley Fair, Full Disclosure, FTC (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2014/09/full-disclosure. The Federal Trade Commission’s
guidance on how to make effective disclosures—for example, by observing “[t]he 4Ps”
(Prominence, Presentation, Placement, and Proximity)—would prove helpful in
determining how to analyze whether a merchant’s notice to a customer before
collecting his mailbox information was sufficiently clear and conspicuous. Id.
148
A business’s good faith implementation of compliant policies and proper
training of employees would serve as a safe harbor under this Note’s proposed
federal framework, such that one-off employee errors or single instances of noncompliance would not subject the business to potential liability.
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lawmakers could not possibly have contemplated their
application in modern retail settings.
They also vary in
important respects, for example, in their conceptualizations of
what constitutes “personal identification information” and what
activates consumer safeguards. These inconsistencies generate
commercial inefficiencies, which harm consumers indirectly in
the form of higher prices. Consumers also suffer more direct
negative consequences as their data privacy remains subject to
variable, impermanent protection across the country.
Accordingly, a federal solution, with a design that contemplates
modern retail goals and does away with unnecessary, ambiguous
concepts, is needed to preempt and standardize the varying state
regulations of these business activities.

